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Abstract: Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be 
understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms 
of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem 
of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that 
are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion 
of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural 
selection that underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we 
develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent 
neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a 
host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help 
us think about more complex “conceptual” representations and not just perceptual ones.  
 
Introduction 
 
Teleosemantics joins two ideas. First, it explains mental representation in terms of 
biological functions. Second, it explains biological functions in terms of natural selection, 
by equating functions with those effects for which biological traits are naturally selected.1 
Teleosemantics emerged in the 1980s as a leading naturalistic theory of intentionality and 
has been developed systematically since that time (see Papineau 2017; Neander 2017 for 
recent introductions).  
 
Three main considerations support teleosemantics. First, it provides a naturalistic account 
of representation. To the extent that biological functions are part of the natural order, so 
too are representations. Second, it accounts for the possibility of misrepresentation, or 
representational error. A representational error, in this view, involves a failure of a trait to 
perform its biological function. Other naturalistic approaches to intentionality, such as 
informational (Dretske 1981), asymmetrical-dependence (Fodor 1990), or isomorphism 
theories (Cummins 1996) have struggled to account for misrepresentation. Third, 
teleosemantics is taxonomically general. It purports to account for representational 
capacities across the living world, and not just in humans and other cognitively 
sophisticated creatures. For example, it can help us understand what it is for a certain 
type of neural activation in an owl’s visual system to represent the location of a vole, or 
what it is for a vervet monkey to represent something as an approaching eagle. 
                                                
1 A few theorists explain representation in terms of biological functions, but adopt 
alternatives to the selected effects account of functions (examples include Abrams 2005 
and Nanay 2013). We will understand ‘teleosemantics’ to exclude this option in what 
follows. We think that such views have trouble accounting for the possibility of 
malfunction (see next section).   
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Teleosemantics has its detractors. Some argue that natural selection is the wrong sort of 
thing to ground representation, reference, and ultimately, truth (e.g., Crane 2003; Burge 
2010). After all, false beliefs and other misrepresentations sometimes promote 
reproductive success, just as true ones do. Others, such as Fodor (1990) and Strawson 
(2008), argue that teleosemantics faces intractable content indeterminacy problems. 
Natural selection cannot make the sorts of fine-grained property discriminations that a 
theory of content must deliver. We do not have space, here, to provide a comprehensive 
response to these challenges (but see Papineau 2017 and Neander 2017 for recent 
defences). Rather, we will focus on one particular problem, the problem of evolutionarily 
novel contents.  
 
Here is the problem: at best, one might think, teleosemantics can help us understand how 
creatures are able to represent evolutionarily recurring features of their environments: 
how owls represent voles; how vervet monkeys represent approaching eagles; how 
humans represent dominance hierarchies, food sources, or mating opportunities. But it 
does not account for our ability to represent evolutionarily novel features of our 
environments, such as microwave heaters, traffic lights, or television celebrities. That is 
because, on the teleosemantic view, a representation’s content is ultimately determined 
by the biological functions of the processes that involve it, which functions, in turn, 
depend on natural selection. So, teleosemantics seems overly limited in its ability to 
account the full spectrum of our representational capacities. 
 
One initially plausible way of avoiding this problem is to recognize that biological 
natural selection, in sense of the intergenerational selection of genes2, is not the only 
selection process in the natural world that creates new functions. The relevant notion of 
selection can be broadened to include other processes as well. For example, Millikan 
(1984), Papineau (1984, 1987, 1993), and Garson (2012) have argued that the trial-and-
error shaping of behaviours and underlying neural structures should count as a function-
bestowing selection process, because of its resemblance to natural selection in the 
evolutionary sense. These kinds of ontogenetic selection processes suggest one way in 
which teleosemantics can solve the problem of novel contents. If new functions can arise 
over the lifetime of the individual, and not just over an evolutionary time frame, then it 
seems plausible that new representations might arise over the lifetime of the individual as 
well.  
 
In this paper, we defend the thesis that operant conditioning, and the neural selection 
processes that support it, can give rise to novel representations. Although the bare 
possibility of such a move has been stated in the literature, we develop it here in four 
specific ways. First, we develop the solution in a precise way using a simplified but true-
to-life example of neural selection. We also show how the example “scales up” to let us 
                                                
2 There seems no principled reason for not including reliably vertically inherited non-
genetic traits alongside genes as subject to intergenerational biological natural selection 
(e.g., Jablonka and Lamb 2005). We shall bypass this issue, however, given that it is 
orthogonal to our concerns. 
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attribute representational properties to more complex neural structures. Second, we rely 
on recent neurobiological research, specifically regarding the role of dopamine in 
instrumental conditioning, to support the biological plausibility of our thesis. Third, we 
defend the move from a host of objections, some from the existing literature and others 
novel. Some argue that the underlying theory of functions we accept is too liberal, some 
hold that single synapses cannot have representational properties, and some might 
maintain that the theory is redundant and therefore unnecessary. We think our theory 
survives these unscathed. Fourth, although we restrict our attention to perceptual 
representations, we sketch how the theory might be developed to help us think about 
conceptual representations as well.  Here we rely heavily on Ruth Millikan’s (2017) 
recent work on concepts. Though we have little systematic to say in this area, we believe 
our work shows the fruitfulness of our generalized selectionist approach. A significant 
virtue of our approach is that it can solve the problem of novel contents without 
introducing new, non-selectionist principles. Its frugality is a mark in its favour.  
 
Here is how our article breaks down. We begin by developing the underlying view of 
function we accept to show that differential reproduction is not necessary for functions, 
but only differential persistence (“What are functions?”). We then show how our theory 
allows synapse selection to give rise to new representations, and how it “scales up” to 
cover more complex cases (“Synapse selection and novel representations”). We then turn 
to recent neurobiological research to support the plausibility of the basic picture we 
develop (“Is our thesis biologically plausible?”). We go on to defend the theory from a 
host of objections (“Objections and replies”). In the concluding section, we consider how 
we might extend the basic picture to other sorts of representations. 
 
What are functions?  
 
What are functions? In our view, the best theory of function is the selected effects theory. 
The selected effects theory holds that the function of a trait is, roughly, whatever it was 
selected for. For example, the function of the stag beetle’s massive mandibles is to 
engage in male-to-male conflict, since that is what they were selected for by 
intergenerational selection. This is not the place to mount a full defence of the selected 
effects theory (see Garson 2016, Chapter 3, for an overview of and response to traditional 
criticisms), but it will be helpful briefly to rehearse its two main virtues: first, that it 
accounts for the explanatory aspect of functions, and, second, that it marks a clear 
distinction between function and malfunction.  
 
First, functions are explanatory. One peculiar feature of functions is that, when biologists 
attribute a function to a trait, they are often trying to give a causal explanation for why 
those traits exist. One virtue of the selected effects theory is that it makes sense of this 
explanatory aspect of functions. A second peculiar feature of functions is that they carry 
with them a specification of malfunction. A trait malfunctions when it does not perform 
its function. This requires that a trait can have a function that it is nevertheless unable to 
perform. At first sight this can seem puzzling. How can something that is not done 
nevertheless be part of a trait’s function? The selected effects theory, however, can easily 
accommodate this. For it holds that which function a trait has depends entirely on its 
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history. By contrast, whether or not a trait can perform that function depends entirely on 
its current structure and dynamics. So, there is no problem understanding how a trait can 
have a function it cannot perform. Tardive dyskinesia involves a dysfunction of the 
muscular system because the musculature is not able to do what it evolved by natural 
selection to do. We do not wish to say that no other theory of function can make sense of 
this, but such theories generally make heavy weather of the issue, to say the least (see 
Kingma 2010).  
 
As noted above, some theorists have noted that the notion of selection, as understood in 
the selected effects theory, should not be understood narrowly to encompass only 
evolutionary natural selection, but that it should be expanded to include processes such as 
operant conditioning. Millikan (1984, p. 28), for example, suggests that behaviours can 
undergo a kind of differential reproduction that explains how they acquire new functions. 
We indicated our view that, if new functions can arise over the lifetime of the individual, 
then perhaps new representations could arise over the lifetime of the individual, too.   
 
Kingsbury (2008), however, raises a challenge to the idea of functions that do not derive 
from intergenerational evolutionary selection. Proponents of the selected effects theory 
have often maintained that functions require something like differential reproduction or 
“copying.” Millikan (1984, p. 18), for example, says that functional traits must be 
members of “reproductively-established families.” Neander and Rosenberg (2012, p. 618) 
think that functions can only belong to what they call a “lineage of traits parsed by 
changes in the selection pressures operating on it.” If we accept this restriction, then any 
attribution of function will require the identification of something like replicators that 
form a lineage. As Kingsbury (2008, p. 502) has put it, “anyone who claims some process 
is a selection process needs to specify what it is, in that process, that reproduces and 
forms a lineage, and even given a very inclusive characterization of reproduction, this 
may not be easily done.” 
 
To illustrate Kingsbury’s point, suppose one is entertaining two different hypotheses, H1 
and H2, and then decides, after some reflection, to accept H1 and discard H2. H1 isn’t 
involved in anything like reproduction; it is simply persisting more or less successfully 
(p. 501). As Kingsbury says, “…to claim that a process is a selection process is to claim 
more than simply that it is a sorting process: it must also be a process which includes 
reproduction and differential reproductive success” (p. 505).   
 
This objection arises in particularly acute form for our suggestion that novel 
representations come from ontogenetic neural selection. It is by no means obvious that 
anything worth calling reproduction occurs during neural development. While neural 
structures are differentially retained during development, there is no clear sense in which 
they replicate themselves. So our appeal to novel neural functions might seem to be in 
danger of falling at the first hurdle.  
 
Our response to this challenge is to deny that reproduction (“copying”) is necessary for 
functions. We think that a trait can acquire a function simply through something like 
differential persistence in a population. In our view, restricting functions to entities that 
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reproduce is highly arbitrary. There seems no immediate theoretical motivation for this. 
Why not attribute functions to traits simply on the basis of differential persistence, that is, 
the ability of some traits to persist better (longer, more effectively) than others within a 
population?  
 
In short, and pending some important qualifications, we suggest that the function of a 
trait is that effect that contributed, in the past, to the differential reproduction, or the 
differential persistence, of that trait (see Garson 2017 for more detailed discussion). The 
first part, “differential reproduction,” includes the sorts of entities that the traditional 
selected effects theory includes (such as the intergenerational selection of genes and 
perhaps antibody selection). The second part, “differential persistence,” includes 
processes such as neural selection. We will say a few more words by way of defence in 
the section entitled “Objections and replies.” 
 
Let us make one final point about the contrast between differential persistence and 
differential reproduction. One might suspect that extending functions to include 
differential persistence is unnecessary. Perhaps one could think about neural selection as 
involving the differential reproduction of synapses. (See, for example, Artiga 2010, who 
suggests that various forms of ontogenetic learning fit the model of differential 
reproduction.) Consider the following scenario: suppose a neuron forms a synapse with 
another neuron. Suppose, as a result of that synapse, the first neuron is able to derive the 
nutritive support it needs to form new synapses. Shouldn’t we say that the later synapses 
are “copies” of the earlier synapse, or better, that there is a kind of parent-offspring 
relationship between the earlier and later synapses?  
 
We think it’s a stretch to describe this case as involving reproduction or “copying” of 
synapses, for two reasons. In the paradigm cases of reproduction, there is a fairly tight 
causal connection between parent and offspring. Consider, for example, a cell that forms 
two daughter cells in mitosis. But the relationship between earlier and later synapses is 
highly indirect. An analogy can help. Suppose someone has a child, and the child brings 
her so much joy that she decides to have another. The first child is, in this indirect way, a 
cause of the second. But the second is not a reproduction or “copy” of the first; the 
parent-offspring relationship is entirely out of place here. We think the same point 
attaches to the differential proliferation of synapses.  
 
An anonymous reviewer suggested a further way to challenge the idea that the later 
synapse is a “reproduction” of the earlier one: namely, there does not seem to be anything 
like inheritance of properties. Inheritance, here, would require the “winning” synapse to 
create synapses that are more similar to it than they are to “losing” synapse. We find no 
reason to think this would be the case, and so agree that this is another reason for not 
counting the proliferation of synapses as a case of differential reproduction, but as 
differential persistence instead.  
 
Synapse Selection and Novel Representations  
 
We have shown how functions merely require differential persistence, not reproduction. 
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The benefit of this insight is that we can account not only for the emergence of new 
functions, but also the emergence of new representations, over the individual’s lifetime. 
This section will show how neural selection, by creating new functions, also creates new 
representations in the brain.  
 
There are actually different types of neural selection, depending on the neural structure 
that undergoes competitive interactions: synapse selection, whole neuron selection, and, 
possibly neural group selection (Garson 2012). Here we will focus on synapse selection, 
both because it is empirically well-documented and because it is most directly involved 
in creating new representations.  
 
The simplest possible case of synapse selection involves at least two synapses. Suppose 
there are two neurons, N1 and N2, each of which synapse onto the same target neuron, NT 
(see Figure 1). This yields two synapses, S1 and S2. Suppose that, when S1 is activated, it 
yields some useful downstream effect E. Synapse selection happens when, as a 
consequence of causing E, S1 is retained and S2 is eliminated.  
 
In our view, if one synapse is retained over another because of some useful effect, then 
that synapse comes to have the function of producing that effect. Applied to our simple 
example, S1 comes to have a novel function, namely, the function of producing E, for that 
is the activity that explains its differential retention in a population. (The population here 
consists of two synapses, S1 and S2.) The case just described represents a “convergent” 
pattern of synapses, where two neurons innervate the same target. We could have just as 
easily illustrated the case through a “divergent” pattern of synapses, where a single 
neuron innervates two different targets. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A simple case of synapse selection.  
 
One core function of synapse selection is to help the individual adapt to the contingencies 
of its environment (Innocenti and Price 2005, p. 958). Consider how that might work in 
practice. (We have chosen a very simplified model for the purpose of illustration; soon 
we will show how the model “scales up” to accommodate more biologically realistic 
scenarios.) Suppose we place a rat into a new environment, one it has never been in 
before. There are two sorts of objects in that environment, red things and blue things. The 
red things are edible and the blue things are not. Suppose there is a certain neuron, N1, 
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that tends to be activated by red things. Suppose there is another, N2, that tends to be 
activated by blue things. Suppose N1 and N2 both synapse onto the same target neuron, 
NT, yielding S1 and S2 as in Figure 1. Whenever NT is activated, it causes feeding 
behaviour in the rat. Now, suppose, on some occasion, the rat approaches a red thing; S1 
is activated, and the rat is rewarded with food. Suppose the rat approaches a blue thing; 
S2 is activated; the rat tries to eat it, but there is no reward. Suppose, as a result, that S1 is 
retained and S2 is eliminated. Then, we wish to say that the function of S1 is to cause 
feeding behaviour. For that is what it did that led to its differential retention in the 
relevant population (that is, its retention over other entities that were part of the same 
population, namely, the population consisting of S1 and S2).  
 
We have seen how synapse selection creates new functions. But how does it create new 
representations? To see this, we should begin with the observation that a function of a 
trait is always some effect or another that it produces. However, sometimes a trait has the 
function of producing some effect in the presence of a certain stimulus or situation 
(Neander 2017 calls these “response functions”). For example, the pineal gland has the 
function of producing melatonin in response to the dimming of light.   
 
When a state has the function of producing some behaviour when some condition obtains, 
teleosemantics allow us to say what content that state it has. The content of the state 
depends on what, in the world, it must correspond to in order for the resulting behaviour 
to be successful. The representational vehicle, here, is simply the activation of S1. S1 has 
the function of producing feeding behaviour. So, what must S1 correspond to in order for 
feeding behaviour to be successful?  
 
The orthodox teleosemantic answer to this question is the presence of something edible. 
The function of the feeding behaviour is that the rat should ingest something nutritious. 
This will be achieved if the activation of S1 is accompanied by the presence of something 
edible. Therefore (and setting aside various “content indeterminacy” worries), the 
activation of S1 represents edible things (e.g., Millikan 1989b, p. 290).  
 
Neander (2006, 2013, 2017) has developed a slightly different way of thinking about 
teleosemantics. In her view, the content of the representation does not depend as much on 
how the representation is utilized (“consumed”) by the system, but on how it is produced. 
So in our example she would say that S1 represents, not edible things, but red ones. As 
she sees it, if the rat were to respond to a red thing that is not edible, S1 would not be 
malfunctioning, but fulfilling its function of detecting red things. Neander agrees that the 
only reason that S1 has the function of becoming activated in the presence of red things is 
that this disposition has been selected for enabling the rat to eat. Her view and the 
orthodox consumer view agree in their basic understanding of what the neural structure is 
selected for. In specific connection with attributing content, however, she places the 
emphasis on the producer mechanism rather than the consumer mechanism, partly 
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because she thinks that these content ascriptions are more relevant and helpful in the 
context of neuroscience.3  
 
This is not the place to adjudicate between different versions of teleosemantics, 
specifically, the traditional consumer approach and Neander’s producer approach. The 
more fundamental point is that the basic picture outlined here is consistent with the 
general way teleosemanticists ascribe content. In other words, whichever specific version 
of teleosemantics one chooses to adopt, all can agree that neural selection can give rise to 
new representations. Note in particular that nothing in these theories is inconsistent with 
some functions deriving from differential persistence rather than reproduction.  
 
In our example we have focused on neural selection acting over single synapses. But 
nothing limits our basic picture of novel representations to single synapses. First, the 
basic model described here would apply just as well if S1 were taken to represent a longer 
neural pathway involving many different synapses in succession. Second, the basic model 
would also work if, instead of only two neurons synapsing onto NT, there were several 
neurons synapsing onto NT, and some of them, as a group, are preferentially reinforced 
over others. Suppose a stimulus (such as a dog) causes the simultaneous activation of a 
group of synapses. Suppose the group of synapses that responds most vigorously to the 
stimulus is differentially strengthened, that is, strengthened over some other group that 
does not respond quite as vigorously (see Figure 1 of Wiggs and Martin 1998, p. 230, for 
discussion of how the selective elimination of groups of synapses might “sharpen” 
perceptual representations; also Wagner et al. 2004). In that case, we may treat the former 
group of synapses as a unit for the purpose of assigning a function to it. Nothing in our 
basic account limits us to attributing functions, and hence contents, to single synapses.   
 
We will make two more points of clarification before moving on. The first has to do with 
the nature of the representational vehicle involved here. What is it, precisely, in the brain 
that carries semantic content? In the simplest possible scenario, where S1 has been 
selected over S2, the vehicle is S1’s being activated: specifically, the release of 
neurotransmitter into the synapse (or other signalling molecules as in gap junctions). 
However, in more complex cases, the representational vehicle could be something more 
sophisticated. For example, suppose there are two neurons, N1 and N2, both of which 
synapse onto the same target NT and both of which are responsive to the same external 
                                                
3 We have reservations about Neander’s way of carrying out the teleosemantic project. 
We think she has problems with distal content. For Neander, some neural activity R (for 
example, some optic nerve activity in the frog) represents some external stimulus S (a fly) 
so long as there is a mechanism that has the evolved function of producing R in response 
to S. But consider some inner, proximal stimulus, S*, that forms a midway point in the 
causal chain between S and R, for example, the retinal impression created by the fly. 
Then, presumably, there is an evolved mechanism that has the function of producing R in 
response to S*, too. But intuitively, R is about S, and not also about S*. Neander’s 
proposed solution (2013, 2017) in terms of asymmetric “informational” relationships 
between various stimuli has recently come under fire from Schulte (2018). One benefit of 
relying on consumer-based teleosemantics is that it skirts this problem entirely. 
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stimulus. Suppose that N1 responds with a much more rapid firing rate (measured by 
spike count over a certain window of time) than N2, and as a consequence, S1 is retained 
over S2. Then we should say that the representational vehicle, in this case, is a spike train 
with spike count n.  
 
We have explained how behaviour-relevant neural synapses can come to represent novel 
environmental conditions as a result of ontogenetic neural selection. This shows that 
there is at least one way in which teleosemantics can account for novel representational 
content. However – and this is our second point of clarification – we certainly do not 
want to imply that all cases of neural representation of environmental conditions must 
involve such ontogeny-based selection. It is perfectly possible that many similar 
behaviour-relevant neural synapses are “hard-wired” because of intergenerational genetic 
selection, in which case they will represent in an entirely analogous way.  
 
For example, consider that such genetic selection has come to ensure that certain groups 
of optic fibres in the frog are activated by bug-like stimuli, and that such stimuli prompt 
tongue-snapping behaviour (see Lettvin et al. 1957, who called these optic fibres the 
“bug-perceivers”). Those hard-wired pathways will have the selection-based function of 
prompting that behaviour in those circumstances, and so, according to teleosemantics, 
will represent the presence of an insect (or possibly something with an insect-like 
appearance). In this kind of case, however, the function will be based on intergenerational 
genetic selection, rather than on ontogenetic neural selection, and the represented 
condition will be one present in the ancestral environment, and not just in the organism’s 
individual experience. 
 
Interestingly, there is reason to suppose that the genetic selection of hard-wired neural 
connections will often be a consequence of prior ontogenetic development of just those 
same connections. Genetic selection on its own can have trouble evolving structures 
whose functionality requires a number of different genetically controlled components to 
be in place. The co-occurrence of the relevant genes will be rare, and in any case will be 
broken up in sexual species by genetic recombination. But if such structures can initially 
be developed by ontogenetic learning, then any one of the relevant genes will have a 
selective advantage on its own, since it will make it easier for the organism to learn the 
other components. This suggests that the genetic shaping of complex neural structures 
might be driven by a kind of progressive “Baldwinization,” in which proto-versions of 
the structures are first learned, and then come increasingly under genetic control, which 
then allows more complex versions to be learned, which in turn also come under genetic 
control, and so on (Papineau 2005, 2006).  
 
Is our thesis biologically plausible?  
 
So far, we have simply illustrated how an instance of synapse selection might give rise to 
novel representations. But does the brain really work that way? Recent research into the 
neural foundations of operant conditioning supports the basic picture presented here, by 
suggesting that dopamine acts as a reinforcement signal that selectively strengthens 
certain synapses because of their rewarding consequences. We shall briefly outline the 
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main features of this research.  
 
Brain scientists have long suspected that dopamine plays a role in operant conditioning. 
In the 1950s, work by the neuroscientists Olds and Milner (1954) showed that electrical 
stimulation of certain brain regions could cause rats to vigorously self-stimulate. At the 
time, it was unknown which cortical areas and neurotransmitters were involved. More 
recent research using ontogenetic methods has clarified the issue, by showing that it is 
specifically the stimulation of dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of 
the midbrain that causes rats to self-stimulate (Witten et al. 2011).  
 
As to the precise function played by dopamine in the VTA, one widely accepted 
hypothesis is that dopamine signals not rewards per se, but unexpected rewards (and 
punishments). This is the “reward-prediction error” hypothesis, which holds, in part, that 
an unexpected reward causes a phasic firing of VTA dopamine neurons which release 
dopamine onto limbic structures, specifically, the nucleus accumbens, as well as neurons 
in the prefrontal cortex. (See Schultz et al. 1997; Schultz and Dickinson 2000; also see 
Columbo 2014 for a recent philosophical discussion.) 
 
The connection between this phasic VTA firing and reinforcement of behaviours is less 
clearly understood, but one plausible idea is that the phasic release of dopamine acts as a 
kind of global signal that selectively reinforces just those synapses that were involved in 
the rewarding behaviour. As Schulz and Dickinson (2000, p. 490) put it, “with 
competing synaptic inputs, neuronal activity occurring simultaneously with the error 
signal would be preferentially processed. This mechanism would result in the biasing, 
prioritization, or selection of certain inputs over others…” Schultz et al. (1997, p. 1598) 
explicitly describe the reinforcement of certain synapses over others as a sort of 
“competition:” “the dopamine signal influences behavioural choices by modulating the 
level of competition in the dorsal striatum.”   
 
Which synapses, precisely, are undergoing selection? The relevant synapses connect 
structures in the prefrontal cortex to the nucleus accumbens (corticostriatal synapses). 
Possibly, these synapses carry information about the sensory features of the stimulus to 
the nucleus accumbens, where they can affect behaviour. In our view, if one 
corticostriatal synapse is “preferentially processed” over another, because it helps 
generate appropriate behaviour in the presence of the stimulus, then its function is to help 
generate that behaviour in the presence of the stimulus. In short, it is plausible that 
synapse selection is actually involved in operant conditioning. (For more discussion on 
structural changes in corticostriatal neurons in learning and addiction, also see Robinson 
and Kolb 1997; Hyman and Malenka 2001; Kauer and Malenka 2007.)  
 
Objections and replies 
 
In this section we will consider four main objections to the picture of novel contents 
developed above. The first objection is due to Kingsbury (2008), who argues that 
differential persistence is far too liberal a basis for novel functions. The second is due to 
Cao (2012), who maintains that we should not think of the activation of single neurons, 
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or single synapses, as carrying information, but only large collections of neurons. Third, 
we consider whether our theory has the counterintuitive consequence that associative 
learning cannot create new representations. Finally, we consider whether our appeal to 
ontogenetic selection processes is redundant, given the prospect that Millikan’s 
distinction between direct and derived proper functions can do the needed work.  
 
Objection 1: Is differential persistence too liberal for functions?  
 
Kingsbury considers, then rejects, one of the crucial moves we make here. We argue that 
functions merely require a population of entities that undergo something like differential 
persistence; differential reproduction is not necessary. She argues that such a move would 
render the underlying theory of function overly liberal to the point of vacuity. She asks us 
to imagine a bunch of rocks on a beach that vary in their hardness. Some rocks, because 
of their hardness, erode less quickly than others. So the rocks persist differentially 
because of their hardness. But surely we do not want to say that hardness is a function of 
rocks (Kingsbury 2008, p. 496; also see Lewens 2004, p. 127 for similar thoughts).  
 
We agree that hardness is not a function of rocks. We also agree that one way to avoid 
that implication is by restricting functions to things that reproduce. But that is not the 
only way to avoid that implication. We think that there are at least two other promising 
options, one that appeals to the nature of populations, and one that hinges on the 
requirements for cumulative selection.  
 
First, natural selection always takes place in a population (e.g., Millstein 2009; Godfrey-
Smith 2009), and it is widely agreed by philosophers of biology that a population must 
involve some form of fitness-relevant interactions between its members (Godfrey-Smith 
2009, p. 52; Millstein 2009, p. 271; Matthewson 2015, p. 180). My behaviour must have 
some effect on your fitness, or vice versa. In our view, groups of neural structures can 
form populations, but collections of rocks cannot. That is because, unlike a collection of 
rocks, neural structures can be involved in competitive interactions that affect each 
others’ fitness. (In line with this, we deny that “fitness-relevant interactions” requires 
reproduction; we read “fitness-relevant interactions” broadly enough to encompass 
interactions that affect a neural structure’s prospects for survival.) The crucial point for 
our purposes is that a group of rocks on a beach clearly fails the requirement, since the 
rate at which one rock erodes has no effect on the rate at which others erode (Garson 
2017).  
 
Let us now consider the second way to block the attribution of functions to rocks. This 
invokes the requirements for cumulative selection. In the standard biological examples, 
natural selection has a cumulative character. Adaptations build on adaptations to form 
extremely complex and sophisticated traits, such as the human eye. But there is nothing 
like cumulative selection taking place in our pile of rocks. It is not as if those rocks that 
are “selected” on account of their hardness then go on to participate in new selection 
processes for other traits. As Kingsbury (2008, p. 6) puts it, the example merely involves 
a “one-shot sorting” process.  
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There are principled reasons for attaching importance to cumulative selection. Some 
philosophers of biology hold that natural selection never explains the origin of traits, but 
only their retention (the so-called “negative view”). In their view, origins always result 
from mutations, and the role of selection is merely to decide which mutations escape 
elimination (Sober 1984, 1995). Karen Neander has responded that this argument only 
applies to “one-shot” selection processes. When it comes to complex products of 
cumulative selection, like the human eye, then selection clearly plays a role in building 
traits, as well as preserving them. It is only after selection has first fixed the primitive 
stages of the trait in the population that it is possible for later selection to add on 
improvements (Neander 1995; see Godfrey-Smith 2009, pp. 48-53).  
 
Neural selection can also involve a version of cumulative selection. Consider the well-
studied retinal ganglion cells (RGC) of the zebrafish, which form synapses with the optic 
tectum. Recent evidence suggests that when two or more retinal axons are competing 
over tectal sites, the “winning” axon not only gains control over a single neuron, but it 
can send forth new branches (axonal arborization) and make new synaptic partners (Hua 
et al. 2005; Gosse et al. 2008; see Kalil and Dent 2014 for discussion). In theory, the 
“winning” neuron could go on to engage in further rounds of competitive interactions. 
Cumulativity is thus apparent at the neural level (see Cziko 1995, pp. 64-69 for more on 
the prospect of cumulative neural selection).  
 
Perhaps there are reasons for not restricting functions to traits that undergo cumulative 
selection. Consider the famous peppered moth (Biston betularia) in Manchester in the 
nineteenth century. In the 1840s, the dark form represented a small fraction of the 
population relative to the white; by the 1890s, largely as a result of industrial pollution, it 
spread to more than 90% of the population. Here, the relevant selection involves a fairly 
simple trait, wing colour, and a fairly simple activity, camouflage. It’s not clear, at the 
outset, that there’s anything like cumulative selection going on. Nonetheless, many would 
say the dark wing has the function of camouflage.4  
 
One possible move is to distinguish between sorts of functions that do and do not require 
cumulative selection. For example, Allen and Bekoff (1995, p. 615) introduce the notion 
of natural design to describe the cumulative cases where natural selection actually 
changes the structure of some trait, rather than simply changing trait frequencies, while 
allowing that the simpler non-cumulative process can give rise to functions. 
 
If we do adopt this more permissive line on functions, then we will not be able to rule 
hardness of the rocks non-functional on the grounds that it lacks the right kind of 
cumulative provenance. Still, there remains the point that the rocks do not form an 
                                                
4 Similarly, not all neural selection need be cumulative. Consider synapse selection in the 
neuromuscular junction in rats. At birth, several motor neurons synapse onto each muscle 
fiber; within several weeks, only one remains. Here, the “winning” neuron does not 
typically go on to make new synaptic partners, but we would still be happy to say that its 
synapse acquires a new function via differential persistence. 
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interacting population, which in any case gives us reason to deny that they are subject to 
a function-bestowing selection processes. 
 
All in all, then, there is plenty of room to block Kingsbury’s worry that trivial 
counterexamples will crowd in once we take the view that non-reproducing entities, like 
behaviours and neural structures, can acquire functions by selection of effects. The cases 
we are interested can be differentiated from the rocks in two ways that are relevant to the 
attribution of functions: they involve cumulative selection, and this selection operates on 
genuine populations of interacting individuals. The rocks’ lack of cumulative selection 
certainly means that their hardness is not “designed,” in the way that complex traits are. 
And while this might arguably leave open that the rocks have some minimal level of 
functionality, along with the peppered moths, even this much is ruled out by the lack of 
an interacting population. 
 
Objection 2: Can single neurons or synapses have representational properties?  
 
We stated that if synapse S1 is selected over synapse S2 by virtue of producing some 
useful behaviour in response to a certain stimulus, then the activation of S1 constitutes a 
representation, and its content is whatever in the world S1’s consumers need to discharge 
their functions in the historically normal way. For example, in our example of the rat with 
edible foods, the orthodox teleosemantic interpretation of S1’s activation is that there is 
something edible. Cao (2012), however, has argued that we should generally avoid 
attributing contents to single neuron activations (such as a burst of neurotransmitter in a 
synaptic cleft), but only to vast ensembles of neurons or even to the whole organism. The 
reason, she thinks, is that the informational content that one neuron can transmit to 
another is too sparse or uninformative. As she puts the point, “small groups of cells only 
have minimal informational access to anything beyond the activities of other groups of 
cells nearby” (p. 70). For example, a dendrite binding to neurotransmitter only has access 
to information such as, “[There is] X quantity of neurotransmitter in my cleft” (p. 65).  
 
We disagree with her assessment of content. In particular, we think that Cao assumes, 
without sufficient evidence, that the content of a single neuron’s activation must be 
something highly proximal to that neuron. To illustrate the point, suppose there are two 
neurons in succession: N1 and NT, as in Figure 1. Suppose an external stimulus (an edible 
berry) causes N1 to fire, which causes NT to fire, which ultimately causes feeding 
behaviour. What is the content of N1’s firing, that is, activation of the N1-NT synapse? 
She thinks it must be something like, N1 is presently active. As Neander (2017, p. 137) 
would put it, Cao assumes that N1-NT synaptic activation must represent its most 
proximal normal cause. But we do not see why, on her account, a burst of 
neurotransmitter can only be about its own most proximal normal cause.  
 
Not only do we not see how that result follows from her account, but the standard 
consumer-based approach to teleosemantics actually implies something quite different, 
namely, that the release of neurotransmitter has the distal content, there is something 
edible. That is because, on the standard approach, the content of a representation is 
whatever it must correspond to for the consumer mechanisms to perform their function in 
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the historically normal way. Assuming that the ultimate consumer mechanism is, here, a 
motor routine designed to elicit feeding behaviour, then, in order for that mechanism to 
discharge its function, there must in fact be something edible in its environment.  
 
Objection 3: Does our view let associative conditioning create new representations?  
 
Not all cases of novel representational contents resulting from neural development will fit 
our model. In particular, consider classical associative conditioning, or Hebbian learning. 
This involves the reinforcement of synaptic connections between neurons that have 
previously fired together (Kandel et al. 2013, p. 1467). A dog hears a bell repeatedly 
preceding the arrival of food, and the neurons prompted by the bell will become 
connected to those that register the presence of food. We certainly wish to allow this sort 
of learning to give rise to new representations, too.  
 
Suppose we have some organism that is already capable of representing some A and B 
(bells and food say) as a result of either ontogenetic or phylogenetic selection. If it is then 
classically conditioned to anticipate B after detecting A, we can view the synaptic 
connection then formed as representing that A will be followed by B. This will be a novel 
representational content for the organism, for there will be no reason to suppose that As 
were followed by Bs in its ancestral environments. Note that in this case, however, the 
new synaptic representations will not depend on ontogenetic selection for some effect. 
There is no feedback loop that reinforces the synapses just in case some effect occurs. 
Rather the mechanism is simply that neurons that fire together will come to be wired 
together, quite independently of any effects. 
 
This is neither to say that the classically conditioned synapses do not serve functions, nor 
that their novel representational contents cannot be analysed teleosemantically in terms of 
those functions. These functions will not depend on ontogenetic selection, however, but 
will be derived functions, in Millikan’s sense (Millikan 1984, p. 42; also see her 1989a, p. 
288). Millikan’s notion of a derived function hinges on the point that some genetically 
evolved mechanisms have the function of producing traits that will serve further 
functions in relation to their current environments. The chameleon’s camouflage 
mechanism has the function of producing skin colouring that will hide the chameleon 
against the current background. As a result, the current skin colour will have the “derived 
proper function” of hiding the chameleon against, say, the current yellow background. 
But this specific derived function need not be one that was ever served in the 
phylogenetic past. That particular shade of yellow might never have occurred in ancestral 
chameleon environments. 
 
Similarly, we can suppose that the classical conditioning mechanism has the function of 
enabling organisms to form neural associations that will represent whatever regularities 
happen to be displayed in their current environments. This now gives us another way in 
which novel contents can be accommodated by teleosemantics. As well as novel contents 
resulting from ontogenetic selection, as outlined in this paper so far, there are also cases 
where neural structures represent novel environmental features in virtue of their derived 
functions (Kingsbury 2006 develops this theme). In these latter cases, the selection 
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processes giving rise to the relevant functions are all phylogenetic, rather than 
ontogenetic. Intergenerational genetic selection has constructed a learning mechanism 
that, without the help of any further ontogenetic selection, produces traits with current-
environment-related functions.  
 
Objection 4: Is our appeal to ontogenetic selection processes redundant?  
 
The previous subsection raises an obvious question about our emphasis on ontogenetic 
selection in the main body of this paper. Do we need to invoke neural selection to 
account for the functions resulting from operant conditioning? After all, there is the 
option of viewing the neural structures resulting from operant conditioning as having 
derived functions in Millikan’s sense, just as we did with the products of classical 
conditioning.  
 
That is, we could attribute their functionality to their deriving from a mechanism – 
operant conditioning – that itself results from intergenerational genetic selection. The 
function of this operant conditioning mechanism is to produce neural structures whose 
function, in turn, is to adapt the organism to the contingencies of its local environment. 
So viewed, the functions that these novel neural structures acquire during the organism’s 
lifetime (e.g., to produce feeding behaviour in the presence of red berries), would derive 
from the intergenerational selection of genes, independently of the fact that ontogenetic 
neural selection happens to be involved in their development. 
 
A first point to make here is that, even if we accepted this analysis, it would not affect our 
main point. We have been concerned to show how teleosemantics can explain the 
representation of circumstances that are evolutionarily novel. To do so we have observed 
that neural selection results in structures with the function of gearing behaviour to 
evolutionarily novel circumstances, which structures therefore represent those 
circumstances. This point will stand even if we see such functionality as deriving 
ultimately from phylogenetic selection, rather than proximally from neural selection. 
 
Having said that, we think it is problematic to explain the functionality of these 
ontogenetically acquired neural structures in terms of derived proper functions. As we 
noted in the second section, “What are functions?,” the traditional selected effects theory 
unnecessarily, and we think arbitrarily, limits (“direct proper”) functions to traits that 
undergo something like differential reproduction or “copying.” In the present context, 
this arbitrary restriction is what motivates the idea that phylogenetic natural selection 
alone creates direct proper functions, and that neural selection, at best, creates derived 
proper functions. We see no reason to privilege phylogenetic natural selection in this 
way. If the ancestral selection of differentially reproducing genes can underpin functions, 
why deny the same functional significance to the ontogenetic selection of differentially 
persisting synapses?  
 
Perhaps this is not an issue worth fighting over. As it happens, all familiar examples of 
ontogenetic selection mechanisms, such as operant conditioning and the adaptive immune 
system (e.g., Hull et al. 2001) are also mechanisms that have been designed by 
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phylogenetic selection to produce derived functional traits. So, as we observed above in 
connection with neural representation, the traits will come out as having the same 
functions whether or not we view ontogenetic selection as creating functions in its own 
right. 
 
But, just to pursue the point, perhaps there are some few special cases which can focus 
the issue and show that differential persistence selection mechanisms can create functions 
even if they are not the upshot of prior phylogenetic biological design. For example, 
consider the way in which operant conditioning mechanisms can be “hijacked” by the 
ingestion of addictive substances. 
 
It is widely accepted that phasic dopamine functions as a reward prediction error signal in 
operant conditioning mechanisms (see “Is our thesis biologically plausible?”). When 
behaviour leads to biologically rewarding outcomes, then the reward triggers the release 
of dopamine and leads to the reinforcement of relevant synapses. However, the ingestion 
of certain substances, including amphetamines, alcohol, nicotine, opiates, cocaine, and 
benzodiazepines, causes high levels of dopamine release independently of leading to 
reward, and so “short-circuits” the normal reinforcement mechanism to encourage 
behaviours that lead to ingestion of such dopaminergic substances (Butlin and Papineau 
2015). (Opiates play a slightly more complicated role in addiction since, in addition to 
their ability to trigger dopamine release, they can also directly target opioid receptors in 
nucleus accumbens neurons – see Hyman and Malenka 2001, p. 679.)  
 
We can view this short-circuited system as a selection mechanism in its own right, one 
which favours the persistence of just those synaptic connections that lead to dopamine 
release. And, in line with this, it seems natural to say that the behaviours of subjects who 
have been conditioned by this system, as well as the neural structures that facilitate those 
behaviours, have the function of leading them to seek alcohol, or cocaine, or whichever 
dopaminergic substances were the means to such release. 
 
But note that these functions are not derived functions resulting from the operation of the 
normal operant conditioning system. The latter system has the function of generating 
behaviours that in the individual’s experience have led to biologically rewarding 
outcomes. This is not true of behaviours resulting from the dopamine short-circuit. They 
are being generated by a “rogue” selection mechanism, an unintended by-product of the 
normal operant conditioning system. In the presence of dopaminergic substances5, this 
                                                
5 In a sense, the “rogue” system will also be present and operating even in the normal 
cases where biologically rewarding outcomes precede dopamine release. Note that, where 
the biologically designed conditioning system selects for rewarding outcomes, with 
dopamine release merely the procedure it uses to reinforce synapses, the rogue system, by 
contrast, selects for dopamine release itself. In most cases, the rogue system will be 
intertwined with the biological one, they will select the same behaviours, and the non-
standard functionality deriving from the rogue system will go unremarked. It is 
specifically those cases where the rogue system operates without the biological one that 
highlight the non-standard functionality of its selected behaviours. 
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rogue system selects behaviours that do not lead to biologically rewarding outcomes, but 
directly to dopamine release. Their reinforcement properties occur independently of the 
subjective effect of the drug or other aspects of the experience (Hyman et al. 2006, p. 
575).  
 
Still, as we observed, it seems natural to say that such behaviours have functions that 
relate to their rogue selection, of leading the user to seek alcohol, or cocaine, or whatever, 
notwithstanding the fact that these functions are not in line with phylogenetic biological 
design. We take this to support the view that the ontogenetic selection of differentially 
persisting items can create functions independently, even in cases where these are not 
also derived from mechanisms shaped by phylogenetic selection. 
 
Conceptual representations 
  
We have illustrated the possibility of ontogenetically selected novel contents for very 
simple “non-conceptual representations” of conditions like red edible thing now here. 
Readers might wonder how our story might generalize to more complicated cases. 
 
This has been an ongoing issue for teleosemanticists. One strategy would be to adopt a 
multi-tiered approach that appeals to selection only at an initial stage to explain ground-
level perceptual representations, and then works its way up to conceptual representations 
by introducing fundamentally different, and non-selectionist, kinds of processes. (See e.g. 
Sterelny 1990, pp. 138-40, Neander 2017, pp. 205-15.)  
 
We are not convinced, however, that one must move away from selectionist processes to 
understand more high-level, conceptual representations. In humans and other cognitively 
sophisticated animals, selection processes can be invoked to explain not only ground-
level perceptual representations, but higher-level conceptual representations as well. 
Millikan’s (2017) recent work has done much to point the way. The ability to refer to and 
re-identify spatiotemporal particulars, biological taxa, chemical kinds and other 
“substances” allows cognizing subjects to lock onto rich sources of usable information. 
Our cognitive powers are designed accordingly. As we encounter new substances in our 
individual lifetimes, we readily coin concepts whose purpose is track and accumulate 
information about those substances. 
 
A bit of background: Millikan urges us to dispense with the idea of concepts, which are 
supposed to be shared between people, and to adopt the language of “unicepts” and 
“unitrackers” instead. Unicepts are like concepts, in that they compose propositions, but 
they are unlike concepts in that they generally will not be shared between any two 
individuals – they are idiosyncratic. Each unicept comes paired with a corresponding 
unitracker. A unitracker is a mechanism that has the function of re-identifying 
individuals and kinds. My unitracker for the kind dog can be thought of as a mechanism 
that has the function of scanning the environment for instances of dogs, and tokening a 
judgment involving the corresponding unicept (there is a dog). The referent of a unicept 
is just the target of its corresponding unitracker (p. 44). My unicept for dog refers to dogs 
because it is paired with a unitracker that has the function of tracking dogs.  
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So how do unitrackers get their functions? What determines what a unitracker is 
“supposed to” track? Some unitrackers might have their targets innately, because they 
have been shaped by natural selection by virtue of their differential success in tracking 
some evolutionarily recurring feature of their environments. In some cases, where the 
referents are of types that have been encountered in ancestral environments, one can 
imagine “pre-designed” concepts which lock onto entities like individual humans or 
biological species by a mechanism akin to imprinting (p. 74). But that would still leave 
open the question of how there can be unitrackers for entirely novel substances and 
attributes: for traffic lights, or cotton candy, or the property of having a brawny aftertaste 
or three-day stubble. As Millikan puts it, “…how could a totally new kind of unitracker 
emerge, one that is not supplied in advance with any clear method of priming or any 
template” (p. 79)? 
  
In these cases, she suggests that some element of trial-and-error learning will be 
involved, with unitrackers being retained or discarded depending on whether they are 
nonempty and univocal, that is, depending on whether they track one and only one entity. 
Crucially, the test for such unitrackers is that they generally yield judgments that conform 
to the law of noncontradiction. In short, unitrackers undergo a selection process in which 
some are retained and some are discarded on the basis of their conformity to said law: 
“This proxy selection mechanism uses regular conformity of unitracker outputs with the 
laws of identity and noncontradiction as its selection criterion. It discards, retains, or 
alters unitrackers according to their reliability in helping to confirm and reconfirm the 
same judgments…without also producing contrary judgments, judgments that contradict” 
(p. 80). 
 
To use a simple example: suppose someone develops a unitracker that gets “triggered” by 
two kinds of things: cotton candy and fiberglass insulation. He has a corresponding 
unicept, R. (So, when he encounters cotton candy or fiberglass, he entertains something 
like the thought, there is another R, or there is that R stuff again.) At one time, he eats a 
piece of cotton candy and forms the judgment that the substance tracked by the unitracker 
has a sweet taste: R is sweet. Later, he eats a piece of fiberglass and forms the judgment 
that it is not sweet: R is not sweet. The unitracker has produced a contradiction, so he 
either eliminates it entirely, or investigates these substances more carefully as a prelude 
to refining his unitracker or splitting it into two. This would be a case in which 
representations emerge, or are refined, through an ontogenic selection process. Again, our 
point is not to endorse Millikan’s specific views about how novel concepts get off the 
ground. The point is to gesture toward how the selectionist mechanism we describe here 
might be extended to help us think about conceptual representations and not just 
perceptual ones.  
 
We hope that this paper has made it clear how ontogenetic selection mechanisms are a 
legitimate resource for teleosemantics. In particular, we think our appeal to ontogenetic 
mechanisms represents a sharp break from how many teleosemanticists have tried to 
solve the problem of novel contents. As noted above, a standard view in the literature is a 
“two-tiered” view; selection is invoked to explain how evolutionarily archaic 
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representations acquire their contents, and then other, non-selectionist principles are 
invoked to explain how we represent novel environmental properties. Though we do not 
dismiss those attempts outright – they might indeed yield fruitful insights for thinking 
about content – we reject the need for this bifurcated model in explaining novel contents. 
We think the parsimoniousness of our view is one of its virtues.   
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